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ABSTRACT 
Is the phenomenon of postmodernism in architecture and planning a matter 
of superficial style, or does it represent something more fundamental? 
What kind of style is postmodernism, and what kind of style should 
postmodernism be? This paper offers answers to these questions by 
referring to a comprehensive theory of aesthetics as a basis for evaluating 
postmodernism. This theory is sketched out and then postmodernism is 
defined by comparison with modernism. A fundamental split within 
postmodernism is delineated; the postmodernism of reaction is 
characterized by empty formalism, while the postmodernism of resistance 
involves a critical appreciation of the various elements of local context. The 
theory of aesthetics, although only rudimentary, provides obvious support 
for the postmodernism of resistance, or critical regionalism. 
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POSTMODERNISM IN ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING: 
Introduction 
What Kind of Style?l 
Steven C. Bourassa 
Urban Research Unit 
What kind of style is postmodemism in architecture and planning? Does 
postmodemism offer something of lasting value and profound significance? 
Or is it an affected, arbitrary style, a type of mannerism that is destined to 
be replaced by yet another stylistic paradigm? Moreover, given the fact that 
postmodemism is not yet well-defined, it is appropriate to ask the 
normative question: What kind of style should postmodemism be? 
This paper seeks to develop answers to these questions. The next section of 
the paper sketches the outlines of a theory of aesthetics which will serve as 
the basis for evaluation of postmodemism. Postmodemism is then 
described by means of comparisons with modernism and the fundamental 
split within postmodemism is deliberated. The aesthetic theory is :then 
applied to help determine the best orientation for postmodemism. 
A Theoretical Framework For Aesthetic Evaluation2 
A major problem in developing aesthetic theory applicable to architecture 
and planning is the unduly constrictive concept of aesthetics employed by 
most philosophers. The word aesthetics is typically used to refer to the 
study of taste and beauty in the fine arts, yet its Greek root had a much 
broader meaning, encompassing sense perception generally (Punter, 1982). 
The typical concept of aesthetics becomes patently unworkable when 
applied to architecture and planning. This problem stems from the peculiar 
character of the relevant aesthetic object. 
1 This paper was presented at the 1989 annual conference of the Royal Australian 
Institute of Architects, in Canberra. 
2 Some aspects of this theoretical framework are discussed in more detail in my paper, 
"Toward a theory of landscape aesthetics" (Bourassa, 1988). 
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The aesthetic object of architecture and planning is neither environment, 
which is too broadly defined, nor building, which is too narrowly defined. 
Environment is unsatisfactory, as it includes things that are not perceived. 
Building is unsuitable because it ignores the important relationship between 
a structure and its context. Scruton (1979) observes that architecture is (p. 
11): "an art of the ensemble". That ensemble is best denoted landscape, 
defined broadly to include both the urban and rural scene.3 Landscape is a 
better term than environment because, as Appleton notes (1980: 14): 
"'Landscape' is not synonymous with 'environment'; it is 'the environment 
perceived,' especially visually perceived". 
Philosophers of aesthetics have tended to focus on discrete objects of art. 
This tends to exclude landscapes as aesthetic objects because landscapes 
contain elements of both art and nature and they are also inextricably bound 
up with everyday experience. The problem, then, is to extend the scope of 
aesthetics to include objects as complex as landscapes. A beginning of a 
solution to this problem is suggested by John Dewey in his Art as 
Experience (1934). Dewey argues that aesthetics is a part of everyday 
experience and not limited to certain experiences of artists or art 
connoisseurs.4 In support of this argument, Dewey suggests that there is a 
biological basis for aesthetics, because that is the only way he can account 
for certain aesthetic responses to natural scenery which humans seem to 
have in common. 
Reacting to Dewey, Susanne Langer, in her Feeling and Form (1958), 
argues that his theory goes too far in reducing aesthetics to animal drives. 
She sees aesthetics as the philosophy of art (p. 36): 
3 Townscape and similar terms therefore refer to types of landscapes. 
4 Writing specifically about landscape aesthetics, Punter (1982) makes the same point; 
however, he bases his conclusions on a materialist critique. Speaking more generally, 
Habermas (1985) also sees a need to integrate aesthetics with everyday life. According to 
Boyer, if this were accomplished (1986: 46), "Then aesthetic expression, which includes 
architecture, would speak of the wholeness of the relationship between man and nature 
and not the alienation of both". 
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The true connoisseurs of art ... feel at once that to treat great art 
as a source of experience not essentially different from the 
experience of everyday life ... is to miss the very essence of it, 
the thing that makes art as important as science or even religion, 
yet sets it apart as an autonomous creative function of a typically 
human mind. 
While Langer is correct to emphasise the uniquely human, creative aspects 
of art, her concept excludes the everyday landscape as an aesthetic object. 
What is needed is a theoretical framework which can accommodate the 
philosophies of both Dewey and Langer, recognizing the significance of 
biological motivation, while also respecting the significance of art and 
human creativity. 
A hint of a solution to this problem is provided by Gaston Bachelard in his 
'--~~M--~-- ~· • --· ---. -- • 
The Poetics of Space (1969). Bachelard suggests that human mental 
structure be used as a model for aesthetic analysis. In this regard, Bachelard 
refers to Jung's conception of the mind. Jung divided Jhe mind into three 
levels: the conscious, the personal unconscious, and the collective 
unconscious. The conscious and the personal unconscious are uniquely 
human, while the collective unconscious is not. The latter contains the 
archetypes, which are analogous to instincts and serve as the biological 
underpinnings for aesthetic behavior.5 Thus Jung's schema is compatible 
with Dewey's thesis. Jung's model is also quite compatible with Langer's 
aesthetics because it recognises that part of human mental structure is 
uniquely human. 
5 Neurophysiological research, particularly that of MacLean (1973a; 1973b), has 
provided support for Jung's ideas. According to MacLean, the human brain is divided 
into three parts which he calls reptilian, paleomammalian, and neomammalian. Both in 
terms of structure and function, the reptilian and paleomammalian brains are similar to 
their counterparts in the brains of more primitive animals. The neomammalian brain (or 
neocortex) is more uniquely human and is the seat of those capabilities (such as language) 
which are found only in man. In regard to the reptilian brain, MacLean notes (p. 8): "On 
the basis of behavioural observations of ethologists, there are indications that the reptilian 
brain programs stereotyped behaviours according to instructions based on ancestral 
learning and ancestral memories". Research on brain physiology has also revealed direct 
connections between the visual system and both the paleomammalian (or "limbic") brain 
and the neocortex (MacLean, 1973a; 1973c). Furthermore, it appears that each of the 
different sections of the brain may respond to sensory information in its own way, 
indicating, for example, that instinctual and rational responses to landscapes could occur 
simultaneously. 
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Concepts of the existential movement in psychotherapy provide a basis for 
further articulation of a theoretical framework for the aesthetics of 
landscape. May (1958b) observes that the existential movement seeks (p. 7) 
"to analyze the structure of human existence ... ". One result of that 
analysis is the identification of three simultaneous modes of existence-the 
Umwelt, the Mitwelt, and the Eigenwelt (May, 1958a). The first of these is 
the biological world. According to May (1958a: 61): 
For animals and human beings the Umwelt includes biological 
needs, drives, instincts-lhe world one would exist in if, let us 
hypothesize, one had no self-awareness. It is the world of natural 
law and natural cycles, of sleep and awakeness, of being born and 
dying, desire and relief, the world of finiteness and biological 
determinism, the "thrown world" to which each of us must in 
some way adjust. 
Thus the Umwelt could be said to include the contents of the collective 
unconscious, as defined by Jung.6 The second mode is the social or cultural 
world (p. 62): "the world of interrelationships with human beings". The 
last is one's personal world (p. 61): "the mode of one's relationship to one's 
self". 7 Thus there are three distinct and fundamental modes of human 
existence and, correspondingly, three potential modes of aesthetic 
experience of the world. Clearly, any comprehensive theory seeking to 
6 According to May (1958a: 90), most existential analysts reject the concept of the 
unconscious (see also Binswanger, 1958: 326) and therefore would probably object to the 
reference to Jung in this context. Existential analysts would prefer to characterize 
biological responses to environment as non-verbal rather than unconscious. This is 
consistent with MacLean's (1973a) characterization of the reptilian and limbic brains (see 
footnote 5 above) as being non-verbal, yet in communication with the neocortex in other 
ways. He writes (pp. 123-124): "There are clinical indications that the reptilian- and old 
mammalian-type brains lack the neural machinery for verbal communication with the 
neocortex. . . . But to say that they lack the power of speech is not to disparage their 
intelligence. Nor does it mean they can be relegated to the unconscious, when in actuality 
they may be wide awake". 
7 Meyer (1979) uses a similar tripartite system to articulate his theory of style. He 
defines style as (p. 3): "A replication of patterning, whether in human behavior or in the 
artifacts produced by human behavior, that results from a series of choices made within 
some set of constraints". He outlines three types of constraints (laws, rules, and 
strategies) which operate at three levels analogous to the Umwelt, Mitwelt, and 
Eigenwelt. 
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explain human aesthetic experience of landscape must address each of the 
three modes of existence. 
The biological and cultural modes of landscape aesthetics have been 
explored by Appleton (1975) and Costonis (1982), respectively, to cite two 
of the most notable contributors. As May (1958a) notes, the personal mode 
is relatively difficult to grasp intellectually; it is ill-defined because it is not 
quite clear what is meant by "one's relationship to one's self'. It is perhaps 
for this reason that it has not been addressed by researchers in aesthetics.8 It 
is helpful, as a starting point, to view the personal mode of existence as that 
which transcends the constraints or conditions of the biological and cultural 
modes. Before pursuing this point, however, it will be useful to outline 
some of the characteristics of those constraints and conditions. 
Although it considers only biological aspects of landscape aesthetics, 
Appleton's book, The Experience of Landscape (1975), was the first major 
attempt to establish a theory of landscape aesthetics. Appleton's basic thesis 
is that a landscape which appears to offer satisfaction of biological needs is 
one that will also provide aesthetic satisfaction.9 He calls this idea habitat 
theory. Since the "ability to see without being seen" is an important means 
for achieving biological needs, that ability is itself a source of aesthetic 
satisfaction. This part of his thesis is labelled prospect-refuge theory. 
Prospect-refuge theory describes a mechanism that protects individuals 
from hazards, a third type of environmental feature which plays an 
important role in Appleton's schema. - Furthermore, it seems that the 
aesthetic appreciation of the refuge corresponds with the intensity of the 
dialectical relationship between the refuge and the prospect or the hazard.10 
8 For example, my (Bourassa, 1988) attempt to synthesize a comprehensive theory of 
landscape aesthetics fails to address the Eigenwelt explicitly. 
9 It is of interest at this point to recall MacLean 's (1962) observation that the limbic brain 
(p. 289; see footnote 5 above): "acts upon information in terms of feelings, particularly 
emotional feelings that guide behavior with respect to the two basic life principles of self-
preservation and the preservation of the species". (See also MacLean, 1958a; 1958b.) 
10 One can cite numerous examples which support Appleton's theory. Bachelard's The 
Poetics of Space (1969) provides numerous examples from literature, while Jackson's 
(1970) descriptions of Grand Central Terminal and the Vienna Hojburg are also clearly in 
step with prospect-refuge theory. For other examples, see Cullen's discussion of 
5 
With respect to the cultural mode of landscape aesthetics, Costonis has put 
forth a convincing thesis in his article, "Law and aesthetics: A critique and 
reformulation of the dilemmas" (1982). Costonis rejects formalist 
approaches to aesthetics, and argues that symbolic, nonsensory aspects of 
objects are more important than formal qualities. He observes (p. 401): 
"We do not so much discover aesthetically compelling properties in the 
environment ... as ascribe them to it on the basis of our individual and 
cultural beliefs, values, and needs". Costonis advances a "cultural stability-
identity" theory of aesthetics, which maintains that aesthetic values are 
reflections of groups' desires to maintain stability and protect their 
identities.11 
In contrast to the conservative character of the cultural mode, the personal 
mode is rooted in self-awareness and is the locus of insight and creativity. 
As Tuan notes (1986: 97): 
Stability is a condition of the good life. But so is growth. 
Without question, growth is desirable in the human individual. 
Well-being is an expansive feeling, whether one takes in great 
draughts of fresh air or consumes a lovely landscape with one's 
eyes. Life is mere maintenance without a sense of expansion and 
of moving on. 
Cultural change, as well as personal development, finds its source in the 
personal mode of human existence. 
Architecture and planning must address aesthetic experience at all three 
levels of human existence. Although the preceding discussion of theo~ has 
"hereness" and "thereness" in his Townscape (1961), Hiss' (1987) account of Grand 
Terminal and Prospect Park, and Wilson's (1987) analysis of the aesthetics of Italian 
piazzas. 
11 As Costo~is observes, the circumstances of actual aesthetic controversies support the 
argument that the symbolic aspects of the landscape are more important than any canons 
of visual beauty. Numerous examples could be cited in support of Costonis' theory. 
Three good examples are: Costonis' (1982) discussion of the Rice Mansion controversy 
in New York; my (Bourassa, 1988) discussion of the Rittenhouse Square controversy in 
Philadelphia; and Rowntree's (1981) discussion of historic preservation efforts in 
Salzburg. 
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been necessarily sketchy and suggestive, rather than conclusive, it is 
possible to make some preliminary and incomplete recommendations for 
architectural and planning practice. With respect to the biological mode, 
there is a need to emphasise the tension between refuge and prospect, inside 
and outside, enclosed space and open space. In regard to the cultural mode, 
there is a need to respect the need for cultural stability and identity. On the 
other hand, the discussion of the personal mode suggests a need to 
encourage creativity and constructive change. Controversy over change 
seems to arise when individuals act at the expense of cultural values. As 
Costonis (1982) points out, aesthetic controversy is essentially (p. 381) 
"debate over environmental change itself, or to be more specific, the 
question whether that change is culturally disintegrative or culturally 
vitalizing". 
Modernism and Postmodernism 
As the term suggests, postmodernism is characterised by its differences 
from modernism. In its most general sense, postmodernism refers to a 
rejection of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, as embraced by 
modernism. Modernism adopted wholeheartedly the Enlightenment idea 
that rationality could be applied to solve social problems and that the human 
condition could thereby be progressively improved toward some unitary, 
consensual end. As Habermas notes (1985), nineteenth-century romanticism 
led to another theme of twentieth-century modernity; this was the novel idea 
that modernity did not involve idealization and imitation of some past era. 
Thus modernism came to reject tradition and it (p. 4) "freed itself from all 
specific historical ties". A related influence of romanticism was an 
emphasis on the artist's originality and creativity. 
In architecture, modernism came to be associated with a specific aesthetic 
style, known as functionalism. Functionalism was a clear extension of 
modernism's rationalism and abandonment of tradition. It involved a 
rejection of all historical references and an emphasis on a machine aesthetics 
which expressed an image of rationality. Ornament was not permitted 
unless it contributed to the aesthetics of the machine. As Mumford notes 
(1986 [1962): 77), functionalism "sought to make the new buildings look as 
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if they respected the machine, no matter what the materials or methods of 
construction". Functionalism was an "International Style" that was 
appropriate universally, at all places and times, regardless of the cultural, 
historical, climatological, or topographical context. Modernism also 
comprised the idea that each building should be a strong statement of the 
architect's creative ability. 
In planning, modernism was epitomised by the idea that it would be possible 
to resolve urban problems through a rational process of comprehensive city 
planning. Land use could be rationalised through zoning, which would 
would insure the separation of incompatible land uses and prevent 
congestion by enforcing low densities. Slums, and their attendant social 
problems, could be excised through urban renewal. More radical thinkers 
such as Le Corbusier diagnosed the city's problems and found that major 
surgery was needed to combat the evils of congestion and slums. Le 
Corbusier's La Ville Radieuse (1964 [1933]) involved a complete 
abandonment of the historic fabric of the city, including the "death of the 
street", in favor of a "dictatorial" plan (Figure 1). 
The failures of modernism in architecture and planning are well-known.12 
Generally, it is argued that, instead of improving the human condition, 
modernism has contributed to its impoverishment. More specifically, and 
perhaps unfairly, modernism has been blamed for the destruction of the 
city.13 As has already been suggested, however, the most fundamental 
critique of modernism is with respect to its uncritical acceptance of 
Enlightenment rationalism . . The rationality of modernism is viewed 
skeptically as a naive optimism; there is no longer any faith in the idea of 
progress. As Huxtable puts it (1980: 22): "Today there is no certainty about 
12 There have been a number of popular critiques, such as those by Blake (1977), Brolin 
(1976), and Wolfe (1981). 
13 Prince Charles recently contributed to the fray by criticising modern architects and 
planners for destroying London. Comparing them to the German Luftwaffe, he said 
(quoted by Lohr, 1987): "You have to give this much to the Luftwaffe-when it knocked 
down our buildings, it didn't replace them with anything more offensive than rubble. We 
did that". 
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anything anymore. There are no longer any approved verities to hang onto, 
no yardsticks or ideals that safely and universally apply". 
Huyssen (1981), Lyotard (1984), and others have contributed to the general 
critique of modernism, while Habermas is an important defender of 
modernism. Both Huyssen and Lyotard emphasise the value of pluralism, 
while Habermas emphasises consensus. Huyssen, for example, writes (1981: 
38): 
Habermas ignores the fact that the very idea of a wholistic 
modernity and of a totalizing view of history has become 
anathema in the l970s . . . . The critical deconstruction of 
enlightenment rationalism and logocentrism by theoreticians of 
culture, the decentering of traditional notions of identity, the 
fight of women and gays for a legitimate social and sexual identity . 
outside of the parameters of male, heterosexual vision, the search 
for alternatives in our relationship with nature, including the 
nqture of our own bodies-all these phenomena, which are key to 
the culture of the l970s, make Habermas' proposition to complete 
the project of modernity questionable, if not undesirable. 
In this same vein, planners are no longer enamoured of grand 
comprehensive schemes; they are more comfortable with incrementalism 
and muddling-through. The modem emphasis on the use of zoning to 
rationalise city form by separating supposedly incompatible uses and 
maintaining low densities seems simplistic and contrary to what makes for 
an interesting and lively urban setting (Jacobs, 1961). Along with Robert 
Venturi (1966), planners have come to appreciate (p. 22) "messy vitality 
over obvious unity".14 The emphasis on clearance of slums and other 
problematic parts of the city is viewed as being crudely insensitive to the 
value of existing social networks and historic forms. 
14 Although he is criticised as being fundamentally a modernist (Jencks, 1978: 87-88), 
Venturi is given credit for being the intellectual father of postmodernism in architecture. 
According to Goldberger (1987), for example, Venturi's book, Complexity and 
Contradiction in Architecture (1966), "gave postmodernism its intellectual start". If 
Venturi, with his dubious postmodern credentials, can be considered the father of 
postmodemism in architecture, then Jane Jacobs is surely the mother of postmodernism in 
planning. Her book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), forced a 
radical reconsideration of modernist planning ideas. 
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Figure 1: Le Corbusier's "Voisin" Plan for central Paris would have 
completely erased the historic fabric of the city, replacing it with a regular 
pattern of skyscrapers surrounded by parks. The traditional multi-purpose 
street would have been replaced by a system of unimodal transportation 
routes. 
Figure 2: Postmodern kitsch in Atlanta. This recent condominium 
building, with its arbitrary hodge-podge of architectural elements, is typical 
of reactionary postmodemism. 
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Figu;-e 3: The aesthetics of the machine expressed in the form of student 
housing at the Universite de Toulouse-Le Mirail. The graffiti reflects the 










Figure 4: Robert Stem's building (at left) and Philip Johnson and John 
Burgee's (at right) in Boston illustrate some of the differences between the 
postmodemism of resistance, or critical regionalism, and reactionary 
postmodemism. The Stem building reflects a careful study of its context, 
while the Johnson and Burgee tower is an arbitrary assemblage of historical 
forms. As Goldberger obseives (1988: 31): " ... it is hard not to feel that if 
the designers in Mr Johnson and Mr Burgee's office were looking at books 
for inspiration, Mr Stem and his colleagues were wearing out shoe leather 




Architects have come to design buildings which respect the various 
dimensions of their contexts; it is no longer desirable for each building to be 
a distinct creative statement that stands out from its environment (Brolin, 
1980).1 Brolin maintains that the modernists' (p. 7) "indifference-indeed 
hostility-to harmonious continuity comes from the modernists' violent 
denunciation of derivative architectural forms". Today, an eclectic 
permissiveness prevails with respect to historic form and ornament. 
Architects now appreciate the symbolic function of architecture and the 
symbolism of historic forms and ornamentation. In adopting the na,rrow 
functionalism of the aesthetics of the machine, architects had denied the 
importance of symbolism (Mumford, 1986 [1952] : 86): "In properly 
rejecting antiquated symbols, they . . . also rejected human needs, interests, 
sentiments, values, that must be given full play in every complete 
structure". (Figure 3.) 
This overview, however brief, has catalogued some of the fundamental 
differences between modernism and postmodernism. Modernism 
encompasses Enlightenment rationalism, denial of tradition, a universal 
functionalist style, prohibition of ornament and symbolism, a romantic 
individualism which valued buildings that stand out rather than fit in, and a 
penchant for grand and totalitarian solutions to urban problems. 
Postmodernism, by contrast, is characterised by skeptical distrust of human 
rational abilities, respect for tradition, an eclectic aesthetic, recognition of 
the importance of ornament and symbol, a contextualism which values 
buildings that attend to their surroundings, and an incremental approach to 
the solution of urban problems.15 While this contrast of modernism and 
postmodemism has contributed to the purpose of defining, or at least 
describing, the latter, it is inadequate because it masks a major split within 
postmodemism. As Foster (1985) observes, there are really two distinct 
types of postmodernism (p. xii): "a postmodemism of resistance and a 
postmodemism of reaction". The critical dialogue about these two types 
constitutes the postmodern debate. 
15 Writing in 1977, Robert Stern observed that postmodernism in architecture was 
characterised by contextualism, allusionism, and ornamentalism (see Stern, 1977: 275). 
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The Postmodern Debate 
According to Foster (1985: xi-xii): "In cultural politics today, a basic 
opposition exists between a postmodemism which seeks to deconstruct 
modernism and resist the status quo and a postmodemism which repudiates 
the former to celebrate the latter". These two streams of postmodemism 
are clearly evident in architecture and planning. The postmodemism of 
resistance is advocated by writers such as Boyer (1986), Frampton (1982; 
1985), Huxtable (1980), and Jencks (1978), while the postmodemism of 
reaction is clearly exemplified in the work of Venturi (1966) and Venturi, 
Scott Brown, and Izenour (1977). 
In architecture, the postmodemism of reaction is strictly a matter of style, 
in the narrow, mannerist sense of the word (Figure 2). Venturi (1966) 
spurred a radical change in the reigning tastes of the modem movement 
when he rejected the exclusionary style of functionalism in favor of a 
relatively eclectic, but purely formal, contextualism. Historical allusion 
and ornament became desirable elements of architecture and it was no 
longer necessary for buildings to express the functionalist image of 
rationalism.• The eclecticism of Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour (1977) 
even went so far as to extol the "commercial vernacular" of the Las Vegas 
strip. But again this was strictly a formal conceit, devoid of any critical 
consideration of content. This kind of postmodemism is rightfully 
criticised as "an instrumental pastiche of pop- or pseudo-historical forms" 
(Foster, 1985: xii), "do-it-yourself history" (Huxtable, 1980: 26), 
"cardboard scenography" (Frampton, 1982: 76), or an example of 
"precisely that avalanche of academicism, commercialism, and kitsch that is 
always ready to swamp our culture in the absence of a tradition vigorous 
enough to resist it" (Kramer, 1987: 327). Huxtable sums up the problem 
(1980: 26): "It takes a creative act, not clever cannibalism, to tum a building 
into art".16 
16 Goldberger (1987) notes that some current architecture students are so dissatisfied 
with the superficiality of prevalent postmodern theory and practice that they are reverting 
back to modernist forms (p. 56): "they fear that post-modernism is unable to look at 
architecture as something deeper than a question of choosing a few pretty cornices for a 
few multimillion-dollar houses". 
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A reactionary postmodemism in planning parallels that in architecture 
(Dear, 1986: 379). Boyer (1986) and Jacobs and Appleyard (1987) note an 
inability to plan the form of the city-an abdication to market forces of 
control over urban form. Those authors, together with Krumholz (1987), 
also lament planners' apparent lack of social ideals. Instead of a reformist 
concern with improving the quality of life in the city, there is passive 
accommodation of the market. Planning is a matter of managing programs 
and reacting to market demands rather than a matter of imagining the future 
of the city (Neutze, 1988). 
In contrast to the postmodemism of reaction is the critical postmodernism 
of resistance (Figure 4). According to Alexander Cooper (quoted by 
Ganem, 1987: 70): "As soon as we get through all this nonsense about fake 
Greek, fake Roman, fake whatever, the serious practitioners will be doing 
things that reflect very positively the place where they're being built". And: 
"If there is a trend that does make sense right now, it is a very powerful 
sense of regionalism". Frampton (1985) calls this trend critical regionalism, 
a term which he attributes to Tzonis and Lefaivre (1981).17 Frampton, more 
than anyone else, has succeeded in elucidating a meaningful direction for 
postmodemism.18\:ritical regionalism is a highly self-critical approach to 
architecture and planning. It recognises the importance of context, but this 
recognition is not limited to the acknowledgement of existing architectural 
forms. It also appreciates the significance of local culture, social 
institutions, techniques, climate, topography. The critical regionalist is 
aware of universal techniques, but does not try to apply them arbitrarily, 
without respect to local conditions. At the same time, the critical regionalist 
does not resort to a sentimental vernacular or a reactionary historicising. 
17 Jencks' (1978) calls his version "radical eclecticism". Jencks' concept, while useful, 
is somewhat limited by its focus on the semiotic aspects of architecture. Frampton's 
critical regionalism deals more broadly with the problem. 
18 There are, however, some aspects of Frampton's critical regionalism which could 
benefit from further clarification. Some of these points are discussed in the commentary 
on Frampton's Modern Architecture: A Critical History (1980) which appears in his 
subsequent book, Modern Architecture and the Critical Present (1982: 46-59). 
Particularly noteworthy are Colquhoun's observation that Frampton is perhaps too critical 
of the use of historical forms (p. 49) and Dunster's desire that Frampton be more explicit 
about the politics underlying his critical history (p. 51). 
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The critical regionalist goes beyond the vernacular and the universal in a 
creative synthesis which seeks to increase (Frampton, 1982: 76) "the cultural 
density of the built fabric" . .lil:Tuis is another way of saying that the critical 
regionalist seeks to enhance the identities of places, to intensify their 
cultural significance. Webber's (1964) "non-place urban realm" is 
explicitly rejected as a model for city form (Frampton, 1985: 25). The 
critical regionalist realises that urban form must be bounded and defined if 
it is to serve as a repository for human meaning. Critical regionalism's 
(Frampton, 1982: 81) "salient cultural precept is 'place' creation; its general 
model is the 'enclave'-that is, the bounded urban fragment against which 
the inundation of the place-less, consumerist environment will find itself 
momentarily checked". 
Conclusions: Aesthetic Theory and Postmodernism 
The theory of landscape aesthetics provides clear support for the 
postmodernism of resistance, critical regionalism,19 Although the 
implications of the theory are only rudimentary, critical regionalism is 
patently consistent with them. The theory of aesthetics presented here is 
based primarily on the idea that human beings have three modes of 
existence. These three modes have been referred to as the Umwelt, Mitwelt, 
and Eigenwelt, or the biological, cultural, and personal worlds. The 
biological mode of aesthetic experience is addressed by Appleton's habitat 
theory. This theory leads to the conclusion that contrasts of refuges and 
prospects or hazards afford aesthetic satisfaction. The critical regionalist's 
concern with contained forms or enclaves and their boundaries is congruent 
with the implications of Appleton's theory. It is clearly impossible to have a 
dialectic of refuge and prospect or refuge and hazard without bounded 
spaces. 
19 Although the aesthetic theory was presented here in an a priori manner, this was done 
only for expository purposes. The facts of postmodernism have helped to inform the 
theory, just as the theory helps one to evaluate postmodernism. Thus it would be more 
correct to say that the theory of landscape aesthetics and the critical postmodernism of 
resistance are mutually reinforcing. 
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Some of the most satisfying spaces are enclaves open to prospects. One 
thinks particularly of the Piazza San Marco in Venice. A less familiar 
example is in the French hill town of Cordes. Smith (1977) describes the 
two squares in the center of Cordes (p. 133): 
One is partly covered, in a manner which is common in France, 
with a kind of enlarged version of a medieval barn. This space is 
tightly enclosed except for one corner which provides access up a 
wide flight of steps to a higher plateau, shaded by tall trees and 
placed with a dramatic view over the distant hills. 
While these types of spaces20 serve as ideals for the postmodernism of 
resistance, the postmodernism of reaction is not particularly concerned with 
the enclosure of exterior space. For example, Venturi, Scott Brown, and 
Izenour (1977) are willing to place the A&P parking lot in the same 
historical tradition of "vast space" as Versailles, despite the lack of 
enclosure of the former (p. 13): 
The space that divides high-speed highway and low, sparse 
buildings produces no enclosure and little direction. To move 
through a piazza is to move between high enclosing forms. To 
move through this landscape [i.e., that of Las Vegas] is to move 
over vast expansive texture: the megatexture of the commercial 
landscape. 
In contrast, the critical regionalist would characterise the A&P parking lot 
and the Las Vegas landscape as "anti-space" or "lost space", to use the terms 
of Peterson (1980) or Trancik (1986). 
With respect to the cultural mode of aesthetic experience, there are quite 
obvious points of tangency between aesthetic theory and the postmodemism 
of resistance. The cultural mode is addressed by Costonis' cultural stability-
identity theory, which emphasises the symbolic meanings of places for 
groups of people. Aesthetic value is attached to places which afford 
symbols of cultural stability and identity. Critical regionalism is similarly 
concerned with cultural stability and identity. The critical regionalist wants 
20 For other examples, see the references cited in footnote 10 above. 
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to intensify cultural identity by increasing the "cultural density" of places. 
The reactionary postmodernist, on the other hand, seems to have little 
concern for such matters. 
The personal mode of aesthetic experience is also addressed by critical 
regionalism. The personal mode has been identified as the locus of 
creativity and the source of cultural change. It has been suggested that 
creativity in architecture and planning requires careful attention to context. 
This is appreciated by the critical regionalist, who recognises the role of 
individual creativity as the source of "culturally vitalizing" change.21 The 
reactionary postmodernist, in contrast, tends to engage in "clever 
cannibalism". 
In summary, the theory of landscape aesthetics provides a basis for 
embracing the postmodernism of resistance, critical regionalism, and 
rejecting the postmodemism of reaction. While the witty or ironic forms of 
reactionary postmodernism may be amusing to the architecturally erudite 
or appeasing to the general public, they ultimately reflect a superficial 
formalism. In planning, the acceptance of the status quo may satisfy market 
demands, but it fails to provide a vision of what the city could be. While the 
postmodernism of reaction may not be "culturally disintegrative," it is 
surely "culturally stultifying". As an alternative course for postmodernism, 
critical regionalism offers a means for achieving "culturally vitalising" 
change. 
The postmodern debate is a debate about the kind of style that 
postmodernism is, or should be. Will postmodemism be a style of reaction, 
or a style of resistance? Will it be characterised by an empty formalism and 
a passive commercialism? Or will it be defined by a creative engagement 
with the various dimensions of local context? At present, postmodernism 
runs the risk of degenerating into triviality. But it manifestly has 1he 
potential to be a powerfully invigorating force in the human landscape. 
21 Frampton agrees that creativity is essentially an individual matter (1982: 81): 
"Regionalism ... is not so much a collective effort as it is the output of a talented 
individual working with profound commitment to a particular local culture". 
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